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Overallocation, conflict, and water transfers
Dave Owen




Grantham and Viers’ article 100 years of California’s water rights system: patterns,
trends, and uncertainty Grantham and Viers (2014 Environ. Res. Lett. 9 084012) makes
valuable contributions by mapping the disparities between California’s legal allocations of
water and actual water availability. This perspective article explains that those results both
over- and understate the potential for conflict, but they nevertheless provide useful
information for water policy analysts and educators. The results also provide compelling
evidence of the need for water transfers and, unfortunately, the practical difficulties
associated with achieving those transfers.
In the dry American Southwest, where water use has been vigorously litigated for
well over a century, one might expect that every drop of water would be carefully
allocated and meticulously tracked. In some places, that expectation reflects rea-
lity, but water managers in the American West, and particularly in California,
often face major information gaps (Owen, 2012).
Grantham and Viers have taken a partial but meaningful step toward closing
some of these gaps. Using geographic information systems, water rights and water
use data, and a series of models, they compare the ‘face value’ of surface water
appropriative rights in California to average annual streamflows. This allows a
catchment-by-catchment evaluation of differences between water allocation and
water availability. Grantham and Viers also analyze which categories of users hold
those rights and how this distribution evolved.
Initially, their results seem alarming. California’s rivers are systematically
overallocated, they find, and in many catchments, the quantity allocated exceeds
average annual flow by several hundred percent. The potential for conflict is
obvious.
But California water allocation is always more complex than it initially seems,
and there are several reasons why these results might overstate the threat of
conflict. Legal allocations, as Grantham and Viers note, often exceed actual water
withdrawals (California Court of Appeal, 2000). Most users also return some
water to rivers, and their return flows then can be used again by someone else
(Thompson et al 2013). Consequently, the existence of a gap between legal
allocations and water availability doesn’t necessarily mean there is a gap between
water demand and water availability. And even if the latter gap does exist, prior
appropriation law’s defining trait, at least in theory, is a priority system designed
for the specific purpose of coping with shortage (Thompson et al 2013). The fact
that allocations exceed flows, in short, is a red flag for potential conflict, but not
necessarily an indication of actual problems.
On the other hand—and as Grantham and Viers also note—there are several
ways in which their results are likely to understate the potential for conflict.
Perhaps most importantly, they have modeled the physical availability of water.
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But environmental constraints preclude pumping California’s rivers dry, and legal
availability is therefore lower—sometimes substantially so—than physical avail-
ability (Hanak et al 2011). They also have modeled average flows, and conflicts
intensify in years like 2014, when flows are below average (Owen, 2008). Their
comparison also does not include major water users that are outside the appro-
priative rights system, like holders of riparian rights and groundwater pumpers.
The latter group is particularly enormous, both in terms of the number of pumpers
and the amount of water they use (Choy and McGhee 2014). Groundwater
pumping reduces the amount of water discharging from aquifers into surface
waterways, again lowering, and sometimes eliminating, flows (Glennon 2002).
Actual water availability, in short, is often much less than their results suggest.
Yet even if Grantham and Viers’ study supports only a preliminary under-
standing of California water systems, their results are important in several ways.
First, educators should find the article quite useful for explaining the historic
development and current geography of California water rights. Second, their
catchment-by-catchment comparisons provide a useful first step toward building
more inclusive models.
The third, and more complex, implication concerns the possibilities for
adjustment. Grantham and Viers argue that pervasive gaps between physical water
availability and paper allocations demonstrate the unlikelihood of major new
appropriations from California waterways. Instead, they argue, reallocation is the
future. That claim echoes arguments often made in the literature of water policy
and law; many analysts have argued for major reallocation, often through water
trading (Adler 2008). But Grantham and Viers’ results show that trading, while
perhaps necessary, is going to be even more difficult to implement than many
analysts have recognized.
The reason is straightforward: in a highly over-allocated catchment, water uses
tend to be practically and legally intertwined, and intertwinement makes trading
messy. One user’s return flows will be a key part of another user’s supplies
(Thompson et al 2013). The water that leaks out of an upstream ditch and enters a
shallow aquifer will then recharge the river, serving other users downstream.
Water that one user claims a right to, but rarely actually diverts, again will benefit
other users. Inefficiency, in short, has its beneficiaries, and those beneficiaries
have lawyers. But water transfers generally involve reducing inefficiencies.
Typically, a water user somehow reduces its water use—perhaps by lining a leaky
ditch or by switching to a more efficient irrigation system—and attempts to sell the
right to use the resulting surplus. Or, alternatively, the water user simply sells the
portion of its right that it was rarely exploiting anyway. In an overallocated
catchment, those changes will have ripple effects on multiple downstream and
junior users (as well as the natural environment), and those other users may appeal
to other provisions of California water law, including a traditional water law
doctrine known as the ‘no injury rule,’ to try to block the change (Gould 1988).
That does not mean that transfers cannot occur. To provide one example,
several major California water agencies agreed in 2003 to the largest set of water
transfers in the history of the American West. Hundreds of thousands of acre-feet
of water would shift from agricultural use in the Imperial Valley to urban water
suppliers in coastal Southern California. But the transfer also will have collateral
consequences on water users and environmental systems that had become
dependent upon IID’s inefficiencies. Those impacts in turn have spawned litiga-
tion, which continues to this day (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, 2014). What Grantham and Viers’ data show, unfortunately, is that this is
not likely to be an atypical situation. The paradox of pervasive overallocation may
be that even as it heightens the need for water transfers, it also intensifies their
collateral consequences, making them more difficult to achieve.
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